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NOTES

THE DOCTRINE OF RELATIVE HARDSHIP IN PENNSYLVANIA
The process by which a court of equity determines whether to exercise its discretion to grant or refuse an injunction is sometimes called balancing the equities.
This is a broad term which includes consideration of the relative hardship to the
parties, their good faith or misconduct with reference to the transaction and hardship to the public or to third persons.' The purpose of this note is to examine the
extent to which Pennsylvania courts will balance the equities upon an application
for injunctive relief in encroachment and nuisance cases and, more particularly, to
note how far the doctrine of relative hardship controls the action of the court."
Encroachments
It has been held that where the trespass is wilful a mandatory injunction to
remove the encroachment will be granted without regard to the balance of the
equities.8 The fact, however, that the trespasser has a quasi-sovereign power to
take land by eminent domain proceedings will be taken into consideration and may
4
prevent the issuance of an injunction.
It often happens that the encroachment is unintentional, and it is in this context that it is most often asserted that the granting or refusing of an injunction
is a matter of discretion with a court of equity. The remainder of this section is
devoted to an examination of this equitable principle.
If there be a showing of facts amounting to acquiescence in the act complained
of or of other circumstances which, coupled with delay, will render the granting
of relief inequitable, the chancellor in the exercise of sound discretion will refuse
to interfere. 5 The delay must be to the disadvantage or injury of the defendant in
order to defeat the right to injunctive relief.6 Laches or acquiescence does not depend on time alone but depends on diligence in ascertaining rights and asserting
7
them. Indifference may become acquiescence.
1 McClintock, Equity §§ 144-145 (1948). Considerable confusion results from using the terms
"relative hardship" and "balancing the equities" interchangeably and without discrimination. The
term relative hardship is more properly confined to the situation where the economic harm caused
to the defendant by an injunction would be disproportionate to the benefit gained by the plaintiff.
It is only one of the equities a court may balance.
2 We are not here concerned with the discretion exercised by the courts upon applications for preliminary injunctions. While the court will balance the equities upon such application, the discretion
of the court in this matter is exercised on a basis somewhat different from that on which the withholding of final relief depends. See Walsh, Equity § 57 (1930).
3 Bright v. Allan, 203 Pa. 394, 53 Ad. 251, 93 Am. St. Rep. 769 (1902) ; Baugh et al. v. Bergdoll
et al., 227 Pa. 420, 76 At. 208 (1910); Ballatori v. Tavani, 53 D. & C. 240 (1944).
4 Oliver v. Pittsburgh V. & C. Ry. Co., 131 Pa. 408, 19 At. 47 (1890) ; Caruthers v. Peoples Natural Gas Co. et al., 155 Pa. Super. 332, 38 A.2d 713 (1944). In the latter case the court said, "The
burden on appellee, particularly in view of its quasi-sovereign power to take the land by eminent
domain proceedings, would be disproportionate to the ultimate benefit of appellant."
5 Youse v. McCarthy, 51 Pa. Super. 306 (1912).
6 Baslego v. Kruleskie, 162 Pa. Super. 174, 56 A.2d 377 (1948).
7 Soifer et ux. v. Stein et ux., 101 Pa. Super. 135 (1927). In Mayer's Appeal, 73 Pa. 164 (1874),
a mandatory order to remove an encroachment was refused although the trespass was discovered
and complained of before the building was completed. The chancellor was influenced by the fact

that, with knowledge of the encroachment, the plaintiff had paid for the use of the party wall and
thereby acquiesced in it.
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Where the plaintiff is responsible for the encroachment it would clearly be
inequitable and unjust for the court to direct the defendant to remove it.8 A mandatory injunction will not be granted if such injunction would have an adverse
and serious effect upon the public interest. 9
In a case in which the public interest is not involved and where there is no
fault on the part of the plaintiff but where an encroachment exists as a result of a
mistake of the defendant, Pennsylvania courts will not consider the fact that an
injunction may cause great hardship to the defendant while conferring slight ben'efit to the plaintiff.1" The decision in Pile v. Pedrick" has been subject to considerable criticism because the court did not require the plaintiff to allow the defendant to enter his property in order to remove a one and three-eighths inch subsurface
encroachment, and, consequently, the defendant had to tear down a wall of his
factory. Thirty-nine years later, however, in McNanamy et al. v. FirestoneTire and
Rubber Co.,' 2 under a similar set of circumstances, the court held that the defendant had the right to remove the wall by going on plaintiff's land for that purpose,
on condition that the defendant pay the plaintiff $7.50 for each working day during
the period covered by the actual removal of the obstruction. In Dodson v. Brown,'3
a wall encroached one and seven-eighths inches upon the land of the plaintiff. The
court held as follows:
"When the facts contained in this record are presented, the jurisdiction of the court is complete. There is left in it no option but to enforce the law. The question of 'expense or damage cannot be considered.
The aggrieved property owner's right is absolute. However hard his acts
might be regarded, he asks the court for enforcement of a legal right of a
positive character with respect to land which it is concede was wrongfully taken from him. He is entitled to a decree. The rule in such a case is
founded on sound reason. If damages may be substituted for the land,
it will amount to an open invitation to those so inclined to follow a similar
course and thus secure valuable property rights. Th'e amount of land involved does not change the situation. Here is a wrongful invasion of a
8 Glinn v. Silver, 64 Pa. Super. 383 (1916). Here the plaintiff had negligently erected a wall
on the defendants land which encroached on the adjoining property, and he later bought the adjoining land.
9 Howell v. Sewickley Township, 352 Pa. 552, 43 A.2d 121 (1945). In affirming the principle
that an injunction is a matter of grace and not of right, the court said, "In view of . . . the loss of
the defendant the inconvenience to the public, the smallness of the injury to the complaintant and
its easy compensability in money, . . . complaintant, however clear his right, should be left to his
remedy in damages."
10 Walters v. McElroy et al., 151 Pa. 549, 25 Atl. 125 (1892), is a case involving a permanent
trespass, but it is frequently quoted with approval in encroachment and nuisance cases. There the
court said, ". . . as to the principle invoked, that a chancellor will refuse to enjoin when greater
injury will result from granting than from refusing an injunction, it is enough to observe that it
has no application where the act complained of is in itself as well as in its incidents tortious. In such
case it cannot be said that injury would result from an injunction, for no man can complain that he
is injured by being prevented from doing to the hurt of another that which he has no right to do.
Nor can it make the slightest difference that the plaintiff's property is of insignificant value to him
as compared with the advantages that would accrue to the defendants from its occupation."
11 167 Pa. 296, 31 At. 646, 46 Am. St. Rep. 677 (1895).
12 114 Pa. Super. 282, 173 Ad. 491 (1934).
18 70 Pa. Super. 359 (1918). See also, Weiss and Maen v. Greenburg, 101 Pa. Super. 24 (1930).
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positive right to real property. The court should not be asked to declare in each instance what amount of land should be settled for in damaes and what should come under the rule. It is safer to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court and leave other questions to the contending
parties."
Nuisances
It would seem that there would be less opportunity for the court to exercise
its discretion in nuisance cases since the defendant usually knows of and intends
the results of his wrongful conduct. Nevertheless, the court will balance the equities.
Hardship to the public is an important factor in preventing the issuance of an
injunction in these cases. In Richards' Appeal, 4 the court refused to enjoin the
defendant in the use of a material necessary in the production of iron because iron
was of "such prime necessity" and "greater injury would ensue by granting than by
refusing the injunction". The court further declared:
"In Equity a decree is never of right, as a judgment at law is, but of
grace. Hence the Chancellor will consider whether he would not do greater injury by enjoining than would result from refusing, and leaving the
party to his redress at the hands of a court and jury."
This principle was reaffirmed in 1924, when the court would not enjoin an
electric light and power company from depositing cinders and smoke on adjoining
property operated as a nursery where it appeared that the coal causing the deposits
was used throughout the whole district, that the injury which would result from
such action would be incalculably greater than that which would happen from
refusing it and that there were no appliances procurable by the company which
would minimize the damage to the party complaining.' 5 Where it appears, however,
that an appliance in use in other plants to prevent the escape of a large part of the
refuse from the use of the coal can be acquired at a reasonable expense, a decre
will be entered ordering the installation of such dtvice. If the maintenance of such
16
a device fails to minimize the damage, an injunction will issue.
17
If it is doubtful whether a nuisance in fact exists equity will not interfere.
It is important to note in this connection that no one is entitled to absolute quiet in
the enjoyment of his property. He may only insist upon a degree of quietness con18
sistent with the standards of comfort prevailing in the locality in which he dwells.
-The utmost protection one is entitled to from smoke, odors, gases and noises
is from amounts of these things that are unnecessary and unreasonable under the
circumstances. 19
14 57 Pa. 105, 98 Am. Dec. 202 (1868).

See also Dilworth's Appeal, 91 Pa. 247 (1879).
15 Elliot Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 Ad. 345, 37 A. L. R. 793 (1924).
16 Price et al. v. Philip Carey Manufacturing Co., 310 Pa. 557, 165 Atd. 849 (1933).
17 Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. 102, 10 Am. Rep. 669 (1871); Mirkil v. Morgan et al., 134 Pa.
144, 19 Atl. 628 (1890).
18 Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 Atl. 24 (1910); Quinn v. American Steel Spring

& Mfg. Co., 293 Pa. 152, 141 Atd. 885 (1928).
19 Ebur et al. v. Alloy Metal Wire Co., 304 Pa. 177, 155 Atl. 280 (1931); Hannum et al. v.

Gruber et al., 346 Pa. 417, 31 A.2d 99 (1943).
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Where the existence of a nuisance is clear and substantial harm to the public
is not involved the decisions are of a different tenor. In Evans v. Reading Fertilizing
Co. Ltd.,20 the court, referring to previous expressions of grace and discretion
in the chancellor to grant or withhold injunctive relief, stated:
"It is intended to be laid down that a chancellor, applied to for a
final injunction restraining the continuance of a nuisance, must be discreet, must act with discretion, must discriminate, must take into consideration and give weight to each circumstance in the case, in accordance
with its actual value in a court of equity .... None of them, nor al of
them, can be authority for the proposition that equity, a cas'e for its cognizance being otherwise made out, will refuse to protect a man in the possession and enjoyment of his property because that right is less valuable to
him than the power to destroy it may be to his neighbor or to the public."
The Evans case was quoted with approval in Sullivan v. Jones and Laughlin
Steel Company,21 where the court added:
"The right of a man to use and en'oy his property is as supreme as
his neighbors and no artificial use of it by either can be p'ermitted to destroy that of the other. To this rule if there are apparently some exceptions, the present case is not one of them."
Where the evidence clearly establishes a nuisance in a purely residential neighborhood, it has been held not material that the business was lawful and furnished
employment to a number of persons, especially in view of the fact that the nuisance
22
was created after the plaintiffs had acquired their homes.
Conclusion
Once it is found that an encroachment or a nuisance exists, liability automatically follows, but, since the equities may be balanced, this does not necessarily
give rise to injunctive relief. In balancing the equities the court may properly consider such factors as the intent of the parties, their conduct, including acquiescence
and laches, and harm to the public. Relative hardship will be considered but only
in conjunction with other equities. Standing alone it is not sufficient to deprive
the plaintiff of his right to an injunction.
George H. Bostock, Jr.
Member of the Middler Class
20 160 Pa. 209, 28 At!. 702 (1894).

21 208 Pa. 540, 57 Atl. 1065, 66 L. R. A. 712 (1904). It is interesting and perhaps significant
to note that the court here restrained a manufacturing concern from so operating its works as to
destroy property in a residential district, whereas the subsequent Elliot Nursery Co. Case, n. 15 supra.,
where the injunction was denied, dealt with an injury to a business. The court itself, however, in
the latter case distinguished the cases by pointing to the fact that in the former the defendant had
not done all that could to eliminate the injury complained of. In Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Co., 222 Pa. 72, 70 At. 775 (1908) the defendant was held not guilty of contempt for operating after installing new equipment which reduced the amount of dust emanating from its plant.
The court pointed out that the plaintiffs had submitted to the general annoyance and discomfort
for years without complaint and had chosen to erect their houses within reach of the smoke and dust
without which the factories could not run. See aso, Bigler v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 177 Pa. 28,
35 At. 112 (1896); Hall v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 215 Pa. 172, 64 Atl. 408 (1906); and
Baselego v. Kruleskie, 162 Pa. Super. 178, 56 A.2d 356 (1948), all affirming the doctrine that
where the nuisance is clear there can be no resort to balancing the equities.
22 McKees Rocks Borough et al. v. Rennekamp Supply Co. at al., 344 Pa. 446, 25 A.2d 823 (1942).

